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Abstract: To improve argumentative discourse, it is necessary to make fallacy judgments that take into
consideration the social practice in which argumentation occurs. In this paper, I propose four meta-categories for
fallacies to study the connection of fallacies to their institutionalized discourse. Using the first 2016 U.S.
Presidential Debate as a case study, I show how this framework can be used to propose improvements to
argumentative contexts.
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1. Introduction
Argumentation as a form of communication cannot be studied without acknowledging that it has
both a normative and an empirical dimension (van Eemeren, 2018). While advancing reasons for
a standpoint happens in everyday life, and can thus be studied empirically, such defenses can be
done inappropriately. With regards to studying argumentation in practice, acknowledging the
normative dimension may simply pertain to elucidating the various competencies participants
need to produce, understand and assess argumentation in practice (van Eemeren, 2018).
However, with many argumentation theorists (van Eemeren, 2018), I share an interest in
improving argumentative discourse in practice. Then, it is not enough to just understand what is
seen as appropriate within a specific context. Rather, the question at hand is how to enable the
participants in a particular practice to more optimally use the complex communicative act of
argumentation (van Eemeren, 2018) to attain the goals of the context they partake in.
In order to give feedback on the argumentative discourse, the discourse is evaluated
through making fallacy judgments. Any such judgment should take into consideration the
activity in which the argumentation is used. Hence, fallacy judgments should be tied to the local
context. The contextuality of fallacy judgments is well-recognized within pragma-dialectics (e.g.,
Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, 2015; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007). However, according
to Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015), within the pragma-dialectical framework, it is
inevitable to conclude that certain moves are fallacious but desirable given the institutionalized
context. While, strictly speaking, in various communicative activities certain fallacies are
necessary to commit, rendering a fallacy judgment is problematic as they are not helpful
feedback to the people participating within that context. What is needed is a systematic way of
determining how fallacies have to be called out in order to enable making the argumentation
most functional to realize the institutional goal. This will prevent emphasizing fallacies relevant
for realizing the aims of the argumentative practice or missing certain fallacies that should be
highlighted.
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In this paper, I contribute to the pragma-dialectical theory by proposing some types of
meta-categories for fallacies to enable systematically rendering fallacy judgments that can help
to improve institutionalized argumentative discourse. To do this, first, I review the literature
within pragma-dialectics on the contextuality of fallacy judgments. Here, I also introduce the
meta-categories for fallacies, which can aid evaluating argumentation in context. In section 3, I
introduce my case study, the first 2016 U.S. presidential debate and characterize it as an
argumentative discourse. In section 4, I introduce some fallacies committed in the debate, and
analyze them based on the framework introduced to render a fallacy judgment in presidential
debates to show the function of using a framework of meta-fallacies. The advantages of this
approach are summarized in the conclusion.
2. Context and fallacy judgments in pragma-dialectics
Within pragma-dialectics, fallacies are defined as derailments of strategic maneuvering (van
Eemeren, 2018). Strategic maneuvers are a discussant’s rhetorical pursuits to advance effective
argumentation. These maneuvers derail if the move undermines the demands of reasonableness
as outlined through the model of a critical discussion. As the model of a critical discussion
presents all moves which contribute to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, this means
that fallacies are moves which hinder realizing the critical evaluation of a standpoint (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992).
Starting with Walton (1998), fallacy judgments have become seen as intertwined with
the context of the argumentation. He proposed that what counts as a fallacy depends on the type
of dialogue it is uttered in. Thus, for Walton (1998), a fallacy is not a move which hinders
critical testing of a standpoint, as presumed by pragma-dialecticians (van Eemeren, 2018), but a
move that hinders the specific goal of the interaction one is engaged in. While van Eemeren and
Houtlosser (2007) accept that “it is always conditional upon the background against which it
appears whether an argumentative move is reasonable or not” (p. 60), they do not agree with
Walton that the norms for argumentative discourse change from context to context. As the rules
outlined in the model of a critical discussion ensure the critical testing of a standpoint, and as this
is the point of advancing argumentation, these norms are general across various contexts. Thus,
they advocate for “a radical distinction between, on the one hand, the model of a critical
discussion, which represents an analytic ideal, and, on the other hand, empirical argumentative
activity types, which are to be found in the reality of argumentative praxis” (van Eemeren &
Houtlosser, 2007, p. 64).
However, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) emphasize, having general norms
does not automatically lead to “agreement on the criteria for deciding what counts as a violation
of these norms, nor with an agreement on the interpretation procedure that determines whether
an utterance satisfies the criteria” (p. 104). Argumentation is only “conventionally disciplined in
a certain activity type by specific criteria for determining whether or not a certain type of
maneuvering agrees with the relevant norm” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007, p. 64). Thus,
van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2007) claim the contextuality of fallacy judgments pertains to the
criteria which determine how the general norms for argumentative discourse are to be interpreted
and employed in practice.
While the context of the argumentative activity provides criteria to interpret the general
rules for argumentative discourse, the context can also impose changes to the rules for a critical
discussion (Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, 2015). Then, how the participants are supposed to
2

conduct themselves in this institutionalized argumentative exchange differs from the ideal model.
Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015) propose that such amendments to the ideal model are
still reasonable if they compensate for unfulfilled higher-order conditions as the model of a
critical discussion used as normative benchmark in pragma-dialectics is only the most reasonable
way to resolve a difference of opinion if various interactional preconditions are met (Snoeck
Henkemans & Wagemans, 2015).
There can also be institutionalized changes to the rules for a critical discussion which are
not reasonable from an argumentation theoretical perspective, while they can be defensible for
practical reasons (Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, 2015). This is, of course, not a problem as
in social life practical goals are the most important ones to meet. Yet, the aim then becomes to
realize within a context optimal critical testing within the confines of the institutional goal
(Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, 2015). Thus, one meta-category for rendering a fallacy
judgment is whether the fallacy observed enables realizing the institutional goal. As fallacies
supporting the practical aims in a context do not hinder realizing optimal critical testing, they do
not require further critical attention. However, these, as I call them, institutional fallacies are
helpful in improving the empirical understanding of their communicative activity type.
Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015) also note that within an institution, certain
fallacies are institutionally required. Thus, besides recognizing that some fallacies are desired
within a context, to render fallacy judgments which are helpful to the participants to improve
their argumentative conduct in practice, it is also necessary to discuss whether someone could
have avoided committing a problematic fallacy. The institutionalization of the context may give
the participants no choice regarding whether to commit a fallacy. If the participants are not to
blame for a fallacy, then educating and socializing the participants better will not improve the
argumentative discourse; instead, a discussion regarding changing the conventions of the
institutions is required. In the case of such institutionalized fallacies, participants are excused
from being blamed for having committed a fallacy.
This leads to four meta-categories for moves, which are formally fallacious according to
the pragma-dialectical theory (see table 1).
Table 1
Meta-categories for fallacies within a pragma-dialectical analysis

Institutional

Non-institutional

Institutionalized
(1) Required for institutional
goal and required by
institution
(3) Not required for goal but
part of institutionalized
structure

Not Institutionalized
(2) Required for institutional
goal but not part of
institutionalized structure
(4) Not required for goal and
not part of institutionalized
structure

Institutional fallacies (categories 1 and 2) are not fallacies that need to be called out to criticize
the institutional discourse. Instead, the main function of studying these fallacies is to better
understand and describe the context at hand. Ideally, all these fallacies become institutionalized
in order to guarantee meeting the institutional goal. Regarding attempting to optimize the critical
testing of the standpoint in this context, the non-institutional fallacies (categories 3 and 4) are
most interesting as these point to fallacies which are not helpful to attain the goal at hand.
3

Presuming that argumentation is to be used to come to the most defensible conclusion within the
parameters of the institutional goal, highlighting these fallacies can help improve this situated
argumentation. On the one hand, there are fallacies for which the discussant is fully responsible
(category 4) and the discussant themselves should be blamed for advancing this move. On the
other hand, the institutionalized fallacies point out structural obstacles to optimal critical testing
(category 3). The question I deal with in the remainder of the paper is how these categories can
further aid a pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse in context. First, I discuss
presidential debates as a context for argumentation. Then, I assess some fallacies based on the
local rules for argumentation.
3. The first 2016 U.S. Presidential Debate
The data for this study is the first 2016 U.S. Presidential Debate, broadcasted by NBC on
September 26th from Hofstra University in Hempstead, NY.1 The excerpts are transcribed based
on the Conversation Analytic transcription conventions (see Jefferson, 2004). This debate was
between Donald Trump (DT) and Hillary Clinton (HC), and moderated by Lester Holt (LH). The
genre of communicative activity (van Eemeren, 2010) ‘presidential debates’ differs from the
ideal model of a critical discussion in a number of ways, and thus, following van Eemeren and
Houtlosser (2007) and Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015), it is necessary to determine
the context-specific rules for argumentation. Therefore, in this section, I describe the
argumentative dimensions (the initial situation, starting points, argumentative means and
outcome) of the activity type ‘presidential debate,’ and thereafter I outline the rules for
argumentation within this context.2
The event was introduced by leading NBC journalists Savannah Guthrie and Chuck
Todd, who interviewed debate-specialist Tom Brokaw. Once Guthrie shares that “maybe a
hundred million people could be watching,” Brokaw adds, “a lot of them are still trying to make
up their minds.” The fact that this debate is well-watched, engaged with through many forms of
social media, and, as Guthrie shares, “with the polls tight,” the event is highly significant for
both Clinton’s and Trump’s bid for the U.S. presidency. Reporters backstage outline the
rhetorical challenges the candidates have to overcome in this debate to convince the voters. Thus,
according to the NBC journalists who introduce the audience to the presidential debate, the
debate offers the public a great opportunity to make up their minds and determine who to vote
for in the upcoming election.
Based on this frame, for presidential debates, the initial situation (van Eemeren, 2010) is
therefore a mixed disagreement, where the two candidates defend the standpoint “you should
vote for me.” While the moderator has to remain neutral throughout the event, they control the
specific topic of discussion (Schroeder, 2016). By posing the questions to the candidates, the
moderator determines which sub-standpoint candidates have to raise and defend to make their
case that they are the best choice for the presidency. As it is a televised event, presidential
debates also have a large, non-interactive audience3 who cannot influence the argumentation
being advanced. Yet, this audience is the primary audience for the candidates, as they may cast
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=855Am6ovK7s.
The quotes used in this section are all from the video.
3
That is, while people can use social media to engage, the candidates on stage cannot deal with this feedback during
the event.
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their votes for one of them on election day (see van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs,
1993).
The procedural starting points (van Eemeren, 2010) of the debate are largely set in
advance by the Commission for Presidential Debates but have been agreed upon by both
campaigns (Schroeder, 2016). The campaigns also have negotiated the specific interpretations of
these rules as well as additional rules (Schroeder, 2016). Before introducing the candidates,
Lester Holt, the moderator, summarized the negotiated format to the audience. The debate only
lasts for “ninety minute[s]” and “is divided into six segments, each fifteen minutes long.” The
segments are tied to a topic for discussion introduced through a “lead-off question” by the
moderator, followed by “two minutes [for each candidate] to respond” to the same question. The
rest of the segment is “an open discussion.” Thus, candidates are not supposed to interrupt during
the first 2-minutes, while once they enter into the “open discussion,” this is allowed. Limiting the
candidates topically is, according to Holt, not a problem, as “there are two more presidential
debates scheduled.” The topic is also controlled based on what issues “voters tell us [NBC] are
most important” (and thus supposedly deals with some critical concerns of the electorate).
During the “open discussion,” Holt announces he will “press for specifics” to answers to his
lead-off question. The time limitation of the debate to 90 minutes should not be seen as a
problem, as Holt frames the debate as part of the larger presidential campaign, and thus the
discussion will continue beyond this debate. Thus, the organization of the argumentative
discourse is time- and topic-constrained, and both are in hands of the moderator. 4
As the presidential debates are part of the candidates’ campaigns to become elected
president of the United States in order to change the country (or not), the material starting points
(van Eemeren, 2010) are material facts about the world they have to engage with. Thus,
candidates should acknowledge reported statistics, scientific findings and records of past events
as common ground. It is especially important that the candidates ensure this is the foundation of
their discussion as the judging audience should not be responsible to search for the right facts; to
encourage participation, thresholds should be as low as possible. Values can also be used as a
starting point of the argumentation, but values do not have to be agreed upon by the candidates
(see, e.g., Zarefsky, 2009). Having different values is one way in which the candidates
differentiate themselves from each other; so what matters is that the candidate bases their
argument on values they share with the audience they want to convince to vote for them.
The argumentative means and criticisms (van Eemeren, 2010) of presidential debates
enable the candidates to defend their incompatible standpoint, “You should vote for me.” To do
this, candidates raise sub-standpoints regarding their policy and values in their two-minute
response-slot to the moderator’s question. These sub-standpoints of the candidates are
incompatible as well. Additionally, as presidential elections are for voters not just about policies,
but also choosing someone to execute them (e.g., Benoit & Wells, 1996), candidates have to
defend that they are the right candidate to assume office and can accomplish what they promise.
The candidates also have to critically respond to and engage with each other’s argumentation.
Namely, as the race to the presidency only has one winner, showing issues with one’s opponent’s
argumentation is essential to garner support.
The outcomes (van Eemeren, 2010) of the presidential debate are, first, people’s
judgment on who won the debate. This affects who someone is able to see as the better candidate
and thus their voting intention. This is not necessarily based on the candidate having produced
4

Both are deliberate institutional designs as people have only limited time to watch the debates and broadcasting
time is expensive.
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sound argumentation, but better argumentation than their opponent.5 Voting intentions are
reflected in their responses to opinion polls on who is the best candidate to assume the
presidency. While people can use the debate to determine their actual vote, this outcome is
mediated through many other campaign events as well, which also provide the electorate with
reasons why to vote for one candidate rather than the other. The decision of who to vote for is
made individually by each member of the electorate, although people may deliberate. There is no
going back to the initial situation; one of the candidates will be elected in the end.
These features of this communicative activity type affect the fallacy judgments to be
made in this context. In a critical discussion, participants have an unconditional right to advance
a standpoint (rule 1; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 190-191). As the audience, as
antagonist, cannot directly interrogate the candidates, the limitation of this right to having to stay
on a specific topic determined to be important based on expressed preferences of the electorate is
justified due to unmet higher order conditions. While the time constraints are a practical concern,
they do still not undermine the institutional goal as the discussion is not terminated at the end of
the debate and will continue throughout the campaign. Discussants also have an obligation to
defend their standpoint (rule 2; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 191). In presidential
debates, candidates do not have to accept challenges during their two-minute response slot to the
question of the moderator as this slot is designed to clarify their position to the audience. Hence,
in this slot, the opponent cannot advance a speech act, which counts as a challenge. This rule is
also amended through unfulfilled higher-order conditions. Most importantly, as the candidates
are not face-to-face with their audience, the people they want to convince cannot directly raise
the concerns they have which they want the candidates to address. Therefore, candidates cannot
be expected to minimally respond to the question and just the criticisms of their opponent. They
need to be proactive in developing a defense for their position. Thus, the candidates, like doctors
(e.g., Snoeck Henkemans & Mohammed, 2012), should have a larger burden of proof and are
responsible to share their extensive argumentation.
While attacks cannot be on standpoints not actually advanced (rule 3; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 191-192), the disagreement space (van Eemeren et al., 1993) includes
standpoints tied to their party memberships (e.g., Mohammed, 2018). It also includes positions
claimed throughout the campaign and things said earlier in their life. These are all commitments
relevant to the debate to determine who will be the best option for the presidency. Attacks count
as relevant if they criticize the policy, but also if they concern the ability of the candidate to
realize their plans. A standpoint should also be defended by argumentation that is relevant (rule
4, van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 192); like before, relevant argumentation to a policy
concerns both the policy and the candidate’s character to ensure this policy will become
implemented.
Discussants cannot falsely raise or deny unexpressed premises (rule 5; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 192-193) or starting points (rule 6; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004,
p. 193) in presidential debates. Yet, there are criteria in this context determining when something
counts as an accepted starting point. The candidates have to accept published facts about the state
of affairs in the world. Values can also be valid starting points, but the candidate can freely
choose these to convince the third-party audience. Candidates should not advance argumentation
that is logically invalid (rule 7; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 193-194) or not
appropriately apply argument schemes (rule 8; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 194Notice that voting based on one’s values is reasonable, as the rejected candidate has not argued from a common set
of starting points.
5
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195). Due to values being valid starting points, which do not have to be shared among the
candidates, it is difficult to determine whether argumentative attacks and defenses have been
successful. However, if an attack or defense turns out to not be tenable anymore, the candidate
should drop this line (rule 9; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 195). Candidates also
should use clear language and not deliberately misinterpret each other’s points (rule 10; van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 195-196).
4. Case study: Some fallacies in the first 2016 U.S. Presidential Debate
In this section, I analyze a couple of fallacious moves given the context-specific pragmadialectical framework described in section 3. Then, these moves are analyzed based on the metacategories for fallacies proposed in section 2. In the conclusion, the implications and usefulness
of these meta-categories are discussed. I next consider violations of the starting point rule, cases
of ad hominem and strawman argumentation, and wrong applications of argument schemes.
4.1 Violation of the starting point rule
Following the starting point rule, candidates should build their argumentation either from values
(about which they can disagree) or facts about the world (about which they should agree). In the
segment called “America’s direction,” Lester Holt poses that “race relations” are currently bad in
America, and notices that race has been a big issue in the campaign thus far. Given that the next
president has to heal these divides, he asks the candidates how they plan to do this. Clinton
speaks first and argues that trust has to be restored between communities and the police. In his
response slot, Trump posits that the problem is that in many neighborhoods where minorities
live, there is a lot of violence, and therefore, what is needed is law and order. In his turn, Trump
then specifies that one approach that would work is Stop-and-Frisk, which was according to him
successful in New York City, as this takes the guns out of the hands of criminals. After Trump’s
two-minute slot to respond to the question of this segment, Holt follows up on his argument that
Stop-and-Frisk is needed to bring violence down and mentions that this policy has been rendered
unconstitutional.
Next, Trump repeats his argument that Stop-and-Frisk keeps guns out of the hands of
gangs. When Clinton gets the floor, she picks up Holt’s criticism and claims that “Stop-and-Frisk
was found to be unconstitutional, and in part because it was ineffective. It did not do what it
needed to do” (not shown). Then, Lester continues to probe Clinton on her own position on this
topic, but when Trump receives the floor again he finally addresses Holt and Clinton’s concerns
and defends his position that Stop-and-Frisk is what is needed to improve America’s inner cities.
Excerpt 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

DT

an::d (0.2) <when it comes> (0.2) to: (0.3) eh Stopand->Frisk you know you're talking about< taking guns
away. Well I'm talking about taking guns away from
ga:ngs and people that use ‘em, .hhh and I don't
think I >really don't think< you disagree with me on
this if you wanna know the truth. I think <maybe>
there's a political reason <why you can't say it?> .hh
>but I really don't believe,< in New York City: .h
7

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

HC

DT
HC
DT
HC
DT

Stop-and-Frisk .hh we had two thousand two hundred
murders (0.3) and <Stop-and-Frisk> brought it down to
<five hundred> murders >five hundred murders is a lot
of murders<, (0.5) hard to believe? Five hundred is
like supposed to be good? (0.9) but (.) we went from
two thousand two hundred .hh to five hundred, .hh and
it was continued on by Mayor Bloomberg. .fff And it
was terminated by our current mayor. .hh but <Stop-and
fi-> frisk had a <tremendous> impact on the safety of
New York City, tremendous beyond belief! .hh So when
you say <it has no impact>, it really did it had a
very very big impa:ct.
(.)
Well, it's also (.) fair to say if we're gonna <talk
about> (0.2) teh mayors that (0.5) >under the< current
mayor crime has continued to drop, including murders.
.hh <So the[re is>
[Are you wrong? You're wrong.
No I’m [not.
[Murders are up.
(0.4)
Thi(0.4)
Alright, you check //it

First, Trump again explains that through Stop-and-Frisk, the government can “[take] guns away
from gangs” (1:3-4). Next, Trump claims that he does not believe that Clinton “disagree[s] with
[him]” (1:5) on the necessity of implementing Stop-and-Frisk and implies that she has some
ulterior motive (1:6-7).6 Then, Trump introduces New York City as a case in point to show that
“it had a very, very big impact” (1:19-20) further suggesting that Clinton is dishonest, but also
countering the critical doubt she put forward that it was an ineffective policy. Trump claims that
before this policy was implemented, there were “two thousand two hundred murders” (1:9),
ultimately brought down to just “five hundred” (1:14). Introduced by Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and
“continued on by Mayor Bloomberg” (1:15), Stop-and-Frisk was terminated by the “current
Mayor” (1:16), Bill de Blasio. Hereby, Trump suggests that currently the beneficial effects of
Stop-and-Frisk are not anymore experienced in New York City.
Next, Clinton posits that “under the current mayor, crime has continued to drop,
including murders” (1:23-24), undermining Trump’s argument. While Trump presumed that a
decline in murders while Stop-and-Frisk was used in New York City means that it is an effective
policy, Clinton questions whether this is true. Clinton suggests that there may be another reason
for these results, and thus, she accused Trump of having advanced a post hoc ergo propter hoc.
Next, Trump simply posits that Clinton “[is] wrong” (1:26), to which Clinton simply responds,
“No, I’m not” (1:27). Trump reiterates that “murders are up” (1:28) and when Clinton still does
This is a fallacy as Trump makes Clinton’s claim suspicious through other means than argumentation. While this
could be relevant, if raised, it should be defended by argumentation that Clinton is not sincere. Now it simply is an
accusation.
6
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not concede (1:29-31) he suggests that she should “check it” (1:32) herself.7 Trump simply
denies the statistics Clinton brings in, and vice versa. By denying each other’s numbers, they cast
doubt on the other’s argument. However, both of them hold on to their starting points and
presume that they are right while they are not shared. Hence, as the issue with the starting points
is not resolved, the argumentative interaction becomes fallacious.
Interestingly, looking into the statistics, both Trump’s and Clinton’s representation of the
facts makes sense. By the end of 2013, Stop-and-Frisk had become heavily limited in New York
City (Cheney, 2018) and after this, the number of homicides has remained in the lower to mid300s, and crime overall has kept declining (Cheney, 2018; NYPD, 2020), giving credibility to
Clinton’s position. However, strictly spoken, Trump’s rejection of Clinton’s statistics is correct,
as from 2014 to 2015, the data available to the candidates during the debate, the number of
murders increased from 333 to 352 (NYPD, 2020). This issue of disagreement about the factual
starting points should not have been left unresolved. The candidates should have formulated (and
discussed) their proposed starting points more clearly and explicitly such that it would be clear
what they precisely were taking as a starting point.
To determine which meta-category this case fits in, we should consider the discourse
taking place after this bickering exchange. Holt does not interfere and lets Clinton continue.
Clinton does not specify her statistics but compliments the last two mayors of New York for their
effective approach instead. She claims that “we should learn about what has been effective” and
that one should “[respect] the rights of young men who live in those neighborhoods” (not
shown). Hence, again, Clinton implies that Stop-and-Frisk is not effective and simply
undermines people’s rights. Once she is done, Holt tries to raise the next talking point, which is
that Trump questioned for a long time whether Obama was American-born – this talking point is
delayed as Trump wishes to respond to Clinton. Rather than resolving the disputed starting
points, Trump raises that “The African-American community” “[has] been abused” “by
Democrat politicians” (not shown). Then, Holt succeeds at moving on to the next talking point.
Trump and Clinton’s bickering is first of all a non-institutional fallacy as resolving this
issue regarding the starting points is desirable for the audience as they would gain additional
evidence better enabling them to judge the candidates. It is also not an institutionalized fallacy,
as there is no structural requirement for the candidates to not resolve this disagreement about the
starting points. The candidates are to blame for this fallacy. At this point, Holt had an
opportunity to call out this fallacy committed by the candidates and clear up this confusion for
the audience. Especially as he knows that for candidates it would be rhetorically weak to retract,
or amend, their proposed starting point. As their argumentation is judged comparatively, if they
are the only one showing imprecision – suggesting that they are unprepared – this may hurt their
campaign. Holt did not engage with this fallacy, thereby condoning it. He, however, is not to
blame as he has to uphold an image of neutrality and making sure that the event moves forward
topically. Holt’s complicity is thus an institutionalized fallacy running against the institutional
point. To enable him to eliminate the fallacy, his role has to become redefined.
4.2 Ad hominem argumentation
Personal attacks can be used to invalidate someone’s argument or attack, and can therefore
become an infringement of a discussant’s unconditional right to advance a standpoint or criticize
7

By calling upon his opponent to go check the statistics herself rather than cite them himself, Trump violates the
burden-of-proof rule. However, this fallacy is not focused on in this paper.
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one (rule 1; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). After Trump dodged Holt’s follow-up on Stopand-Frisk concerning it being rendered unconstitutional (see preface to excerpt 1), before she
criticizes Trump’s proposal, Clinton claims that Trump sketches a “dire negative picture” (not
shown) of the African American community. Thereafter, Clinton claims that what has to be
addressed is systemic racism. As people jump to conclusions too easily regarding race, she
believes that the government should increase spending on training for police officers to
overcome racial biases and thereby healing the racial divide in America. Before addressing
Clinton’s criticism of his proposal to do Stop-and-Frisk (as shown in excerpt 1), Trump says the
following.
Excerpt 2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

DT

I do: wanna bring up the fact that you were the one
that brought up the wor:d super predator, (0.5) about
<young (.) black (.) youth> .hh an::d that’s a term
that I think was a eh (0.4) it’s har- it’s been
horribly met, (.) as you know >I think you have<
apologized for it .hhh (0.2) but (0.2) eh I think it
was a terrible thing to say? .hh (0.2)

Trump, here, announces that he “do[es] wanna bring up” (2:1) that Clinton used the word “super
predator” (2:2) in reference to “young black youth” (2:3). When Clinton used it, it was “horribly
met” (2:5) and since then, Clinton “[has] apologized for it” (2:5-6). Yet, this point does not add
anything in an argumentative sense. Clinton accused Trump of being negative about the African
American community because his argument focused on their neighborhoods being overwhelmed
by violence. Clinton’s argument is not undermined by such a premise; instead, Clinton just
admitted that everyone, including herself, has racial biases. Trump’s move implies that Clinton is
no better than him, but in this case, it is not reasonable to raise, as it does not address her current
sub-standpoint under investigation nor invalidates her criticism of his argumentation. Therefore,
as an argumentative move, it constitutes a tu quoque (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992)
aiming at side-stepping Clinton’s attack.
Here, one should recognize two fallacies on Trump’s part. First, the placement of this
exchange is not helpful furthering the institutional goal of clarifying the candidates’ positions,
and thus is a non-institutional fallacy for which Trump is responsible (i.e., not institutionalized).
Second, it is necessary to acknowledge that raising this issue is helpful as otherwise only
Trump’s race-related past would be discussed and Clinton’s biases potentially hindering her to
“heal the [racial] divide” remain ignored. As this point is not further discussed, a comparison
between Trump and Clinton based on their race-related comments cannot be made. Therefore,
topically, Trump’s move is an institutional fallacy. Yet, as there is no right moment where this
topic can be raised – it is not made relevant by the moderator – it is not an institutionalized
fallacy. Clinton also commits a fallacy in this excerpt by not addressing this topic next, probably
because it is not in her interest to raise this issue. While this is completely within bounds given
the structure of the debate, she does not enable a comparison between herself and Trump.
Therefore, her fallacy is institutionalized, while not contributing to realizing the institutional
point. Last, Holt also commits a fallacy. In this case, he neither comments nor shifts the topic of
talk. Like in the case above (excerpt 1), Holt, trying to maintain impartiality, cannot force this
critical testing, and thus commits an institutionalized fallacy.
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Recurrently, candidates invoke personal attacks in the debate at moments when they are
not functional to resolving the difference of opinion, like the case above, but there are also many
instances in which the ad hominem seems to be a valid consideration, but is not developed into
an argumentative exchange. While these ad hominem moves could become good argumentation,
they remain contested accusations. This does not mean that all these instances become
problematic within that context. One example of such a case is shown next (3). Here, Holt asked
Trump and Clinton to defend their positions on dealing with the wealthy. While Clinton wants to
raise taxes on the wealthy, Trump wants to lower them. In her response slot to the question,
Clinton attacks Trump’s proposal as follows.
Excerpt 3
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

HC

DT
HC
LH
HC
DT
HC
DT

But when I look at what you ha:ve proposed, (0.5) you
hav:e (0.8) what- (.) is ca:lled no:w the (.) Trump
loophole. (0.4) because it would so advantage (.) you,
and the business you do. (0.3) you’ve propo:se[d a:=
[who
gave it that name, (0.3) First ever. Who gave it that
na[me, ]
=(.) an
approach
(.) that
(0.3)
has a (.)
<[four]
billion
dollar>
tax
benefit] for (.) your (.) family .hh
[>I’m so sorry< this is (.) Secretary Clinton’s two
minutes]
(0.3)
And when you look a:t (0.2) [what you are proposing
[how much how much for my
family?
(.)
It is: [(.) as I said (0.3) Trumped-up (0.3) trickledown.
[Lester, how much?

In this excerpt, Clinton suggests that Trump does not propose his measure because it will be in
the interest of the American people – which is the unexpressed premise when policies are raised,
as policies are presented as reasons to vote for that candidate – but because it will “advantage
[himself]” (3:3). Specifically, she points out that in his plans there is a “four-billion-dollar tax
benefit for [his] family” (3:9-10), providing a starting point to her argument. Clinton is not going
into more detail, and just continues by asserting that this policy is “Trumped-up trickle-down”
economics (3:18-19) which, she argues, has been shown in the past to not work. Next, Trump
attempts to engage with Clinton’s reasoning. He attempts to keep the topic on the amount of
money his family would receive from his proposed measure (3:15-16) and questions Clinton’s
naming (3:5-7) his measure the “Trump loophole” (3:2-3). Hence, he questions the validity of
Clinton’s analysis. Yet, this subdiscussion is shut down by Holt, as “this is Secretary Clinton’s
two minutes” (3:11-12). Thus, whether Clinton’s suspicion is true is not clarified in this
interaction, and thus her argument seems to be a circumstantial ad hominem.
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This ad hominem advanced by Clinton is rather interesting as it takes place in her
response slot to the question posed by Holt. When Trump tries to open up a discussion on how
much his family would profit (critically spoken legitimate), this is unreasonable within the
context of the debates. As candidates make their opening statements, asking a critical question
then functions as a diversion, to get the opponent off guard. These opening statements are
important to get the candidates to share their message, before they engage in the “open
discussion” about their positions. Thus, while it is desirable to get more detail here on this
accusation, there are good institutional reasons not to do that at this point. Following the criteria
for presidential debates outlined before, discussants cannot advance doubts during these response
slots to the question of the moderator. In that sense, it was Trump who committed a fallacy here.
Still, while Clinton produced a personal attack, which is argumentatively relevant, the not
responding to Trump is strictly spoken fallacious. However, Trump did not repeat his criticism
when he could legitimately cast doubt on Clinton’s argument once he got the floor. While
Trumps comments show issues with Clinton’s reasoning, by not bringing up the fallacy again,
Trump does not require Clinton to address this issue as he resituates the debate through his turn.
After all, Trump did not successfully deny Clinton’s starting point. Therefore, Clinton’s ad
hominem should be seen as an institutional and institutionalized fallacy: candidates have the
right to respond to the question of the moderator for two minutes without an interruption, and
this rule is helpful to the audience to learn where a candidate stands. Holt’s silencing of Trump’s
critiques is a similar fallacy: he supports Clinton to advance her fallacy in order to ensure her
institutionalized rights.
4.3 Strawman argumentation
Attacks on a standpoint should be relevant to that standpoint (rule 3; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 1992). Strawman arguments break this rule by wrongly representing the standpoint
of the opponent such that it can be attacked more easily. Consider the following argument made
by Clinton (excerpt 4). This argument occurs in the segment “America’s direction,” wherein
Trump raised the need of implementing Stop-and-Frisk. After calling this measure ineffective
(see preface to excerpt 1), Clinton offers alternatives, including the need for “common sense gun
safety measures.”
Excerpt 4
1. HC
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

And (.) I (0.5) believe strongly (0.4) that common
sense (0.2) g:un (0.7) safety measures would (0.4)
assist us right now, (0.3) and this is something
Donald has supported, (0.6) along with the gun lobby
right no:w? (0.4) we’ve got (.) too many military:
style weapons on the streets in a lot of places (0.4)
our police are outgunned. (0.4) we need comprehensive
background checks, (0.4) <and we need> (0.2) <to keep
gu:ns> (0.4)out of the ha:nds of those who will do
harm? (0.3) <and we fi:nally need to pa:ss> a
prohibition (0.4) on anyone who is on the terrorist
<watch list>, (0.4) from being able to bu:y a gun in
our country if you’re too dangerous to fly (0.4) you
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14.
15.
16.

are (.) too dangerous to buy a gun. (0.2) So there are
things we can do and we ought to do it in a
bipartis//an way.

Clinton starts with the claim that “common sense gun safety measures” (4:1-2) are needed to
deal with the gun violence problem in America. While at first, she claims that it “is something
Donald [Trump] has supported, along with the gun lobby” (4:3-4), she is highlighting a policy
difference between Trump and herself. Given that she follows up outlining her specific position,
Clinton implies that currently Trump does not support this proposal anymore. While
“comprehensive background checks” (4:7-8) are a policy difference between the Democrats and
Republicans, Clinton follows this up with “if you’re too dangerous to fly, you are too dangerous
to buy a gun” (4:13-14). This implies that Trump disagrees with this position and thus reduces
his position to something absurd. Obviously, Trump, the Republicans and the NRA want to get
guns out of the hands of terrorists, which is what Trump articulates when he has an opportunity
to respond in his next turn. Therefore, Clinton advances a strawman argument.
Here, Clinton simplifies Trump’s position on gun control. This simplification is
functional to the exchange as it points out an important difference between herself and her
opponent regarding their gun control stances. However, misrepresenting the other party’s
position is always a problem. Thus, Clinton should have clarified how people who “are too
dangerous to fly” can get guns under the GOP’s and Trump’s plans and thereby specify the
meaning of her one-liner as otherwise her point is not helpful to the audience to evaluate
Trump’s position. As Clinton also did not have to commit this fallacy, it is neither
institutionalized nor institutional. Holt, as moderator, does not acknowledge this fallacy and
moves on from Clinton’s chance to respond to Trump’s position to a question digging deeper
into her position. This is not a fallacy as it is not his role to define the participants’ positions.
At other moments, strawman argumentation goes beyond exaggeration of differences and
simply becomes a wrong depiction of the opponent altogether. In the following excerpt (5), just
after Clinton referred people to her campaign website to check the differences between her
economic plans and Trump’s, Trump argues that this untrustworthy information. According to
him, her website is not trustworthy because she has made publicly available all her plans
regarding how to deal with ISIS, which makes her plans ineffective. While this is a false
analogy, I focus on the underlying strawman argument concerning Trump’s claim that Clinton
will be unable to handle ISIS.
Excerpt 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

DT

LH
AU
LH
HC

You know what it is no different than this. (0.2)
she’s telling us how to fight ISIS? (.) just go to her
website she tells you how to fight ISIS on her
website. I don’t think General Douglas MacArthur would
like [that too much.
[Right nex- the [nex[((laugh[ter))/(2.4)
[The next segment we’re
contin[uing on the subject about]
[Well at least I have ]a plan to
[fight ISIS?
13

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

LH
DT
HC
DT
LH
DT
LH
AU

[<achieving prosp[erity>
[No no (.) you’re telling the enemy
everything you wanna do
No: we’re not no we’re not.
See, you’re telling the enemy <every[thing> you wanna=
[folks folks
=do. No wonder you’ve been fighting (0.2) no wonder
you’ve been fighting ISIS [your entire adult life.
[folks
((laugh//ter))/(1.5)

Trump claims that Clinton’s plans regarding how to fight ISIS will be ineffective because “she
tells you how to fight ISIS on her website” (5:2-3) and thus she “[tells] the enemy everything
[she wants to] do” (5:13-14) causing her to “[have] been fighting ISIS [her] entire adult life”
(5:19). Of course, a proposed strategy shown to the voters is not the same as the exact strategy
that will be used by the army when actually fighting ISIS on the ground. This is an absurd
projection of Clinton’s plans, recognized by the audience, which responds with laughter (5:7;
5:21). Trump here turns Clinton’s plans as formulated on her website to inform voters into
sending detailed and specific plans directly to the enemy. In contrast to the previous excerpt
discussed, this strawman is not functional at all because criticizing being able to read her plans
does not enable the public to compare their policies. What Trump accomplishes here, is not
having to talk about his own plans.
Like Clinton’s strawman argument (excerpt 4), Trump does not help the voter to make a
more informed decision and did not have to commit this fallacy. While Clinton tries to criticize
Trump’s argument, it simply results in some bickering. In the end, they simply accuse each other
and do not deal with the argumentative issue at hand. Throughout, Holt attempts to move on to
the next segment. As it is his task to keep the topic moving on based on time, he commits an
institutionalized fallacy hindering the audience to compare the candidates.
4.4 Wrong application of argument schemes
In the debates, the candidates also recurrently wrongly apply argument schemes. This leads to
instances like shown in excerpt 6. Here, Trump uses a false analogy, or at least, an unjustified
analogy. It is not immediately clear, but also not clarified thereafter, how Trump’s business
experience will translate into being a successful president. Talking about how the NATO is an
unfair agreement to the U.S., and how other member states are not living up to their duties as
outlined in the treaty, which, Trump claims, Clinton condones, he states that:
Excerpt 6
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

DT
LH
DT
LH
DT

We cannot (0.2) protect (0.2) countrie:s (0.3) all
over the wor:[:ld
[we have just a
where they are not paying us (0.2) what we need? .h
We ha[ve just a few final questions left]
[And (0.3) she doesn’t (.) say that] because
she’s got no business ability? .h (0.2) we need
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8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

hea:rt, we need a lot of things but you have to have
so:me (0.3) <basic ability>, .h (0.2) and sa:dly, (.)
s:he doesn’t have that all of the things that she’s
talking about.hh could have been taken care of during
the last ten years let’s say, .h (.) while she had
great power. .h (0.2) but they weren’t taken care of,
(0.2) and if she ever <wins this race> (0.2) they
won’t be ta//ken care of.

Trump claims that Clinton, like other politicians, has been unable to let countries pay for being
protected by the NATO because of having wrong skills. According to him, the problem is that
“she’s got no business ability” (6:7) which is the “basic ability” (6:9) for being effective in
politics. With some business ability, Clinton would have been able to “[take] care of” “all the
things that she’s talking about” (6:10-11). Thus, in contrast, Trump implies as he has business
experience, he will be an effective president. This argument based on comparison remains
problematic, as it is not clear why business skills are going to help in politics, since it is
organized completely differently. Throughout the debate, Clinton also raised the fact that
“sometimes there’s not a direct transfer of skills from business to government, but sometimes
what happened in business would be really bad for government” (not shown). Throughout,
Trump does not clarify this argument scheme to the audience; it is not subjected to a critical test,
even though asked for and helpful to the voter.
This wrong application of argument schemes is especially important to deal with as the
candidates make claims about why they will be successful once elected in office. Not elaborating
why Clinton’s past experience is unhelpful or why Trump’s business ability will mean he is
going to be an effective president leaves the electorate in the dark as to who to prefer. As the
audience should be able to assess these claims, this misapplication of an argument scheme is not
an institutional fallacy. Trump’s fallacy is also not institutionalized; he could have elaborated his
claims. Holt does not press Trump on this, as with other cases of wrong applications of argument
schemes. Again, he attempts to move on topically. Hereby, Holt condones the fallacy, but does
that due to his institutional constraints.
5. Conclusion
The fallacies discussed in this paper have just been a few examples taken from the first 2016
presidential debate to illustrate the relevance of distinguishing meta-categories for fallacies.
What each of the cases have shown is that by categorizing fallacies based on how they relate to
the institutionalization and institutional point, the pragma-dialectician is better enabled to
provide an argumentative judgment more tailored to the needs of the context at hand. Ultimately,
through determining institutionalized and institutional fallacies, analysts can specifically point to
amendments to be made to the institution and training to be given to the arguers.
For example, based on the cases discussed above, a few preliminary conclusions can be
drawn. The moderator, Lester Holt, often condoned non-institutional fallacies. His role in the
debates is to make sure the topics planned for discussion are allocated the right amount of time,
and all these topics should be covered in a 90-minute time span. The moderator is also not
supposed to engage in argumentation with the candidates. Thus, the moderator was often pressed
to move the debate forward topically and maintain their neutrality, leading to not unpacking
many fallacies committed. While there are good reasons to keep the moderator out of the debate
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as much as possible such that accusations of bias can be avoided as much as possible, as
candidates usually do not address these fallacies themselves, the fallacies remain unresolved. The
suggestion is thus that these institutionalized fallacies running counter to the institutional point
are provided as input to rethinking the role of the moderator in presidential debates.
In the case of Trump’s ad hominem argument, where he mentioned that Clinton has used
the term “super predator” (excerpt 2), Clinton used the format to avoid raising this issue again,
and stayed on topic. In contrast, this accusation by Trump, while not directly relevant to the point
at hand, is important for enabling the audience to compare the two candidates. Hence, a closer
look at how the moves made by candidates may enable improving the format of the debates.
Some moves will have to become included in the structural organization, while others should be
taken out. A closer analysis of the discourse may enable offering suggestions for better inclusion
of character argumentation in the debates. Overall, there are a lot of “normal” fallacies. Various
moves by Clinton and Trump did not further the institutional point and were also not required by
the format. Given their local rhetorical constraints, it is not likely that these fallacies can be
resolved by simply educating the candidates. Instead, the moderator role probably has to be
reconceptualized.
In sum, this study is meant to show the usefulness of meta-categories for fallacies in the
evaluation of argumentative discourse. Further research is needed to provide more
comprehensive analyses on fallacy judgments in presidential debates, and subsequentially
offering concrete suggestions for improvement. What is shown by the presented case studies is
that the framework proposed in this paper can help to analyze the fallacies in more detail to
enhance this process.
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